Seemings and Justification

New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism
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ISBN-13:
9780199899500
Einband:
PDF
Seiten:
304
Autor:
Chris Tucker
eBook Typ:
PDF
eBook Format:
PDF
Kopierschutz:
Adobe DRM [Hard-DRM]
Sprache:
Englisch
Beschreibung:

You believe that there is a book (or a computer screen) in front of you because it seems visually that way. I believe that I ate cereal for breakfast because I seem to remember eating it for breakfast. And we believe that torturing for fun is morally wrong and that 2+2=4 because those claims seem intuitively obvious. In each of these cases, it is natural to think that our beliefs are not only based on a seeming, but also that they are justifiably based on these seemings-at least assuming there is no relevant counterevidence. These considerations have prompted many to endorse some version of dogmatism or phenomenal conservatism. These views hold that, in the absence of defeaters, a seeming that P provides justification to believe P. The main difference is that dogmatism is restricted to some domain, often perception, and phenomenal conservatism is intended to apply to all seemings. Critics worry that such views run into problems with traditional Bayesianism and that they are too permissive, in part because of their implications regarding cognitive penetration. The primary aim of this book is to understand how seemings relate to justification and whether some version of dogmatism or phenomenal conservatism can be sustained. In addition to addressing each of these issues, this volume also addresses a wide range of related topics, including intuitions, the nature of perceptual content, access internalism, and the epistemology of testimony and disagreement.
You believe that there is a book (or a computer screen) in front of you because it seems visually that way. I believe that I ate cereal for breakfast because I seem to remember eating it for breakfast. And we believe that torturing for fun is morally wrong and that 2+2=4 because those claims seem intuitively obvious. In each of these cases, it is natural to think that our beliefs are not only based on a seeming, but also that they are justifiably based on these seemings-at least assuming there is no relevant counterevidence. These considerations have prompted many to endorse some version of dogmatism or phenomenal conservatism. These views hold that, in the absence of defeaters, a seeming that P provides justification to believe P. The main difference is that dogmatism is restricted to some domain, often perception, and phenomenal conservatism is intended to apply to all seemings. Critics worry that such views run into problems with traditional Bayesianism and that they are too permissive, in part because of their implications regarding cognitive penetration. The primary aim of this book is to understand how seemings relate to justification and whether some version of dogmatism or phenomenal conservatism can be sustained. In addition to addressing each of these issues, this volume also addresses a wide range of related topics, including intuitions, the nature of perceptual content, access internalism, and the epistemology of testimony and disagreement.
Contributors

Chapter 1: Seemings and Justification: An Introduction - Chris Tucker


Part I: Seemings and Seeming Reports

Chapter 2: Seemings and Semantics - Andrew Cullison
Chapter 3: Seeming Evidence - Earl Conee


Part II: Foundations of Dogmatism

Chapter 4: Immediate Justification, Perception and Intuition - Jessica Brown
Chapter 5: Problems for Credulism - James Pryor


Part III: Seemings and Epistemic Internalism

Chapter 6: Does Phenomenal Conservatism Solve Internalism's Dilemma? - Matthias Steup
Chapter 7: Phenomenal Conservatism and the Dilemma for Internalism - Michael Bergmann


Part IV: The Significance of Seemings within Specific Domains

Chapter 8: Doxastic Innocence: Phenomenal Conservatism and Grounds of Justification - Robert
Audi
Chapter 9: Agent Centeredness, Agent Neutrality, Disagreement, and Truth Conduciveness - Michael DePaul

Part V: Dealing with Cognitive Penetration

Chapter 10: Phenomenal Conservatism and Cognitive Penetration: the "Bad Basis" Counterexamples - Matthew McGrath
Chapter 11: Searching for True Dogmatism - Peter J. Markie
Chapter 12: Phenomenal Seemings and Sensible Dogmatism - Berit Brogaard

Part VI: Phenomenal Conservatism
Chapter 13: Phenomenal Conservatism and the Principle of Credulity - William G. Lycan
Chapter 14: Michael Huemer and the Principle of Phenomenal Conservatism - Michael Tooley
Chapter 15: Phenomenal Conservatism Über Alles - Michael Huemer

Index
You believe that there is a book (or a computer screen) in front of you because it seems visually that way. I believe that I ate cereal for breakfast because I seem to remember eating it for breakfast. And we believe that torturing for fun is morally wrong and that 2+2=4 because those claims seem intuitively obvious. In each of these cases, it is natural to think that our beliefs are not only based on a seeming, but also that they are justifiably based on these seemings-at least assuming there is no relevant counterevidence.
These considerations have prompted many to endorse some version of dogmatism or phenomenal conservatism. These views hold that, in the absence of defeaters, a seeming that P provides justification to believe P. The main difference is that dogmatism is restricted to some domain, often perception, and phenomenal conservatism is intended to apply to all seemings. Critics worry that such views run into problems with traditional Bayesianism and that they are too permissive, in part because of their implications regarding cognitive penetration.

The primary aim of this book is to understand how seemings relate to justification and whether some version of dogmatism or phenomenal conservatism can be sustained. In addition to addressing each of these issues, this volume also addresses a wide range of related topics, including intuitions, the nature of perceptual content, access internalism, and the epistemology of testimony and disagreement.

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